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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 15-3296 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 HARRISON MICHAEL RINEHOLT, 
                           Appellant  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-14-cr-00314) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 17, 2016 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 24, 2016) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Harrison Rineholt appeals the District Court’s order imposing conditions of 
supervised release following his guilty plea for failure to register as a convicted sex 
offender. We will affirm. 
I 
 On December 10, 2012, Rineholt was convicted of two counts of possession of 
child pornography in York County, Pennsylvania. Although he registered as a sex 
offender and completed the required updates from June 2013 through May 2014, Rineholt 
failed to do so beginning in July 2014 when he fled to Mexico. In December 2014, a 
grand jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
indicted Rineholt on one count of failing to register as a sex offender from July 2014 to 
December 2014, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Rineholt surrendered to Mexican 
authorities in March 2015 and was returned to the United States. A month later, Rineholt 
pleaded guilty to the charge. 
 The District Court sentenced Rineholt to thirteen months in prison, followed by a 
five-year term of supervised release. The Court also imposed seven special conditions of 
supervised release, two of which are at issue in this appeal: (1) Rineholt was required to 
participate in a sex offender treatment program at his own expense; and (2) other than 
brief, unanticipated, and incidental contacts, he was prohibited from associating with 
children under the age of 18, except for family members or children in the presence of an 
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adult approved by the probation officer. Rineholt objected to these conditions, arguing 
that they were not reasonably related to his conviction. He also argued that the prohibition 
on associating with children under the age of 18 was vague. On September 8, 2015, the 
District Court filed an order formalizing the rulings it had made on the record at 
sentencing. Rineholt appealed.1 
II 
 We review the District Court’s order imposing special conditions of supervised 
release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), a court may impose a special condition of supervised 
release only if it is reasonably related to the familiar sentencing factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Special conditions of supervised release also must involve “no greater 
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve the purposes set forth in 
§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). 
Rineholt argues that the condition requiring him to participate in sex offender 
treatment does not reasonably relate to his history and characteristics, and violates 
§ 3583(d)(2). Specifically, he argues that because neither his offense of conviction 
(failure to register as a sex offender) nor his underlying state court conviction (possession 
of child pornography) involved any physical sex abuse, no penological purpose is served 
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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by sex offender treatment. We disagree. Rineholt’s failure to register as a sex offender, 
his unauthorized eight-month stay in Mexico, and his failure to successfully complete sex 
offender treatment while on state supervision demonstrate a refusal to abide by the 
restrictions placed on him as a convicted sex offender and undermine efforts to protect 
the public and prevent recidivism. 
Moreover, sex offender treatment is related to Rineholt’s underlying state court 
conviction for possession of child pornography, which is classified as a sex offense and 
“contributes to the victimization of children and creates a market for child abuse.” United 
States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 189 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “In light of the nature and seriousness of the [possession of child pornography] 
offense, there is a need to both deter others from similar crimes and to protect the public 
from any further crimes. Sex offender treatment is reasonably related to these deterrent 
and preventive goals.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The District 
Court was well within its discretion to find that completing such treatment would protect 
the public and deter crime.2 
Rineholt also argues that the condition prohibiting him from associating with 
children under the age of 18 is not reasonably related to the circumstances of his offense 
                                                 
2 To the extent that Rineholt argues that requiring him to undergo sex offender 
treatment at his own expense was improper, we reject his argument. See, e.g., Miller, 594 
F.3d at 189 (upholding nearly identical condition of supervised release requiring appellant 
to participate in a sex offender treatment program at his own expense). 
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or his history, and involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. 
Rineholt correctly notes that neither his offense of failing to register nor his state court 
conviction involved inappropriate contact with minors. Nevertheless, he was convicted in 
state court of possessing child pornography, which included 351 images and 118 videos 
of children. These facts alone justify a condition limiting his contact with children. See 
United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 269 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Finally, he contends that this condition is overbroad because it restricts his 
association with both male and female children, even though there is nothing in the record 
indicating that he has a gender preference. Rineholt cites no authority to support his 
argument that restricting his contact with minors must be tailored by gender. In any event, 
we have upheld a nearly identical condition limiting contact with “children under the age 
of 18 except for family members or children in the presence of an adult who has been 
approved by the probation officer.” Miller, 594 F.3d at 189; see also Maurer, 639 F.3d at 
76, 85 (upholding condition prohibiting “any contact with children of either sex, under 
the age of 18, without the expressed approval of the U.S. Probation Office”); Loy, 237 
F.3d at 267–68 (same). 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
